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Abstract
Motivated by the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation Act of 2003, we study
the eﬀects of capital income tax cuts in a framework where firms make investment
decisions to maximize their market value and households are subject to uninsurable
labor income risk. We find that the eﬀects of capital gains tax cuts are qualitatively
similar to those found in the absence of household heterogeneity. However, dividend
tax cuts surprisingly lead to a reduction in aggregate investment. This is because
they increase the market value of the existing capital. In equilibrium, households then
require a higher return to hold this additional wealth, leading to a lower capital stock.
This also implies that dividend tax cuts are welfare reducing in the long run, not
only because of the traditional reasons of redistribution from poor to rich, but also
because of a fall in long run aggregate output and consumption. Taking into account
the transition mitigates the losses but the JGTRRA tax cuts still lead to a welfare
reduction equivalent to a 0.5% drop in consumption. In line with empirical evidence,
the model also predicts substantial increases in dividends and stock prices following
the tax cuts.
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1 Introduction
In 2003, the Bush Administration introduced the Jobs and Growth Tax Relief Reconciliation
Act (JGTRRA) which, amongst other reforms, lowered dividend and capital gains taxes.
This act had a sunset provision that stipulated its expiry by the end of 2010, but it was
recently extended for two more years by the current administration. Whether it should
be made permanent or not remains an important subject of political debate. This paper
contributes to the current debate on this issue by analyzing the quantitative eﬀects of these
capital income tax changes in a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium model calibrated to
US data.
Discussions on tax policy, especially capital income tax policy, have always been polit-
ically divisive. One of the reasons is that economic theory provides sound arguments for
both sides of the discussion. On the one hand, reductions in capital taxes are viewed as
providing incentives for investment and, hence, leading to higher economic growth. Indeed,
one of the primary objectives of the JGTRRA reform was to promote capital formation. On
the other hand, reductions in capital taxes are viewed as negative because of the resulting
increase in budget deficits as well as inequality. Although there seems to be a presump-
tion that reductions in capital taxes would disproportionately favor the wealthiest part of
the distribution, it is well known that those relying mainly on labor income could also see
substantial benefits arising from the general equilibrium eﬀects of increased investment on
wages and employment.
Although the non-academic discussion tends to treat all kinds of capital income taxes as
though they have similar eﬀects, the academic community has long recognized the diﬀerence
between taxing returns to investment (e.g. corporate profits, capital gains) and taxing
distributions in the form of dividends. Indeed, a growing literature subscribes to the so-called
new view of dividend taxation, according to which constant dividend taxes do not distort
investment incentives.1 This paper’s main contribution lies in re-examining the diﬀerential
eﬀects of dividend and capital gains taxes in an incomplete markets environment. The aim is
to contribute to our understanding of these taxes theoretically and to provide a quantitative
analysis of the size of the costs and benefits associated with the JGTRRA.
To that end, we build a general equilibrium model in which households face uninsurable
idiosyncratic labor income risk. In addition to risky labor income, households receive cap-
ital income from owning shares in firms. Both labor and capital income are taxed by the
government. An important assumption is that the government taxes dividends and capital
gains at potentially diﬀerent rates. Firms in our model undertake investment with a view
1A detailed discussion of the literature is provided in Section 2.
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to maximizing shareholder value. As shown by Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009),
shareholder unanimity with respect to this objective can be ensured, despite the presence
of shareholder heterogeneity and market incompleteness, by assuming constant returns to
scale production and no short-selling constraints. We calibrate our model to US data and
compute both long run steady states and transitions.
Our results regarding steady states are as follows. A reduction in dividend tax rates has
the surprising eﬀect of reducing aggregate investment and capital stock. To understand the
reason, first note that the dividend tax change does not directly aﬀect the cost of capital. Its
only eﬀect is to raise the market valuation of the existing capital stock and hence aggregate
wealth. If markets were complete, there would be no other eﬀects and we would obtain the
well-known neutrality of dividend taxation under the new view. However, changes in wealth
do matter for household decisions because markets are incomplete. Specifically, households
demand a higher return in order to hold the additional wealth. In equilibrium, firms respond
by reducing the capital stock and this increases the marginal product of capital and, thus,
the rate of return.2 Capital gains taxes have the opposite eﬀect. We find that a reduction
in capital gains tax rates, increases capital stock and investment. Contrary to the dividend
tax, the capital gains tax directly aﬀects the cost of capital and therefore acts as a standard
capital income tax, eﬀectively reducing the after tax return on investment. At the same
time, a fall in the capital gains tax reduces the market valuation of the existing capital stock
and, for the reasons explained above, it also leads to an increase in the capital stock. When
dividend and capital gains taxes are reduced simultaneously to the levels of the JGTRRA
reform, the dividend tax cut eﬀects dominate for two reasons. First, the reduction in the
dividend tax stipulated by the JGTRRA was much larger than the one for capital gains
taxes. Second, there are no capital gains in the steady state of our model economy, so the
capital gains tax rate only aﬀects the steady state through an indirect channel. Thus, in the
long run, the reform reduces investment and the capital stock. At the same time dividends,
stock prices and returns increase substantially, which is consistent with the experience of the
US economy following the reform.3
To evaluate the welfare consequences of the reform, it is important to complement these
long run results with the short run eﬀects of the tax reform. We therefore analyze the eﬀects
of the tax reform taking into account the transition. Starting at the steady state of the pre-
2Note that this is the exact opposite eﬀect on investment to the one intended by the proponents of the
JGTRRA tax reform. A similar point, albeit for diﬀerent reasons, is made in Korinek and Stiglitz (2008).
3Evidence that a decrease in dividend taxes raises dividend payments can be found in Chetty and Saez
(2005) and Poterba (2004). Blouin, Raedy and Shackelford (2004) also find an increase in payout but
provide some qualifications for the result. The eﬀect of dividend taxes on investment is diﬃcult to establish,
as discussed by Chetty and Saez (2005).
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reform economy, taxes change unexpectedly and permanently and the economy is simulated
until convergence to the post-reform steady state. The transition is characterized by a
monotonically decreasing aggregate capital. Aggregate consumption initially increases as
the economy starts dissaving, but eventually falls below the pre-reform level as production
is reduced due to lower investment. Based on a utilitarian welfare criterion, we find an
average welfare reduction of approximately 05% (in terms of consumption equivalents).
This arises from significant long run welfare costs mitigated by short run welfare gains due
to the temporary increase in aggregate consumption.
Additional insight into the reasons for these costs and gains can be obtained by de-
composing welfare eﬀects into "aggregate" and "distributional" components, following the
methodology proposed by Domeij and Heathcote (2004). The aggregate component refers
to the welfare eﬀect arising from a change in aggregate consumption for a given distribution
of consumption across households. The distributional component is defined as the residual.
The decomposition reveals a positive aggregate eﬀect arising from the immediate consump-
tion hike, but a larger negative distributional eﬀect. The distributional component captures
the eﬀect of changes in the distribution of consumption. A reduction in dividend and capital
gains taxes benefits households in the upper tail of the wealth distribution and hurts those
in the lower tail. The marginal utility of the latter is higher (and there are more of them)
so the utilitarian welfare function is negatively aﬀected.
This negative redistribution has been pointed out in existing studies of capital income tax
reforms.4 The dividend tax cut makes this eﬀect more pronounced than in previous studies,
because the bottom of the wealth distribution, which relies mostly on labor income, now faces
a negative general equilibrium eﬀect on wages due to the fall in the aggregate capital stock.
The finding that the aggregate component is positive is also consistent with existing studies.
Note, however, that the reasons are diﬀerent. In those studies, the aggregate component
is positive following a capital income tax cut, because the long run increase in aggregate
consumption dominates the temporary decrease. In contrast, following our dividend tax cut
experiment, aggregate consumption temporarily increases and this dominates the long run
decrease. In terms of winners and losers, we find that individuals at the low end of labor
productivity and those holding zero or very few stocks stand to lose from the reform, whereas
those holding a lot of stocks stand to gain. Overall, we find that only 20% of the population
experiences a welfare improvement, which indicates limited political support.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 points out related articles,
discusses some interesting implications of our result and addresses potential caveats. Section
3 presents the model. Section 4 discusses the theoretical eﬀects of the tax cuts and provides
4See e.g. Aiyagari (1995), Domeij and Heathcote (2004) and Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2010).
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intuition for the results. In Section 5, we calibrate the model to US data and provide a
quantitative evaluation of the welfare implications of the Bush tax reforms both in the long
run and along the transition. Section 6 conducts some sensitivity analysis and Section 7
summarizes and concludes.
2 Related Literature and Discussion
From a theoretical perspective, this paper can be seen as bridging the gap between two
strands of literature. The first strand includes articles that analyze tax reform and optimal
taxation in the presence of household heterogeneity and uninsured idiosyncratic risk. This
is done in an infinite horizon framework by Aiyagari (1995), Domeij and Heathcote (2004)
and Ábrahám and Cárceles-Poveda (2010) among others, and in a setting with overlapping
generations by Imrohoroglu (1998), Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa, Kitao and
Krueger (2009). Our paper is most closely related to the former, in the sense that we use an
infinite horizon setting. A purely cosmetic diﬀerence lies in our choice of modelling firms as
the owners of the capital stock, which we view as the most natural setup in which to think of
dividend and capital gains taxes.5 The crucial diﬀerence is that we explicitly model dividend
and capital gains taxes as opposed to assuming a general capital income tax on the return
to capital.
The second strand of the literature is the one focusing on the eﬀects of dividend taxes
on capital accumulation and the stock market in a framework with no heterogeneity. Mc-
Grattan and Prescott (2005), Gourio and Miao (2008), Santoro and Wei (2009a) and Conesa
and Dominguez (2010) show that, in such a setting, a constant flat tax rate on dividends
only aﬀects stock prices, leaving all other equilibrium quantities such as investment and div-
idends unaﬀected.6 We add household heterogeneity and find that dividend taxes aﬀect all
equilibrium quantities.
Our paper also contributes to the long standing debate in the public finance literature
about the eﬀects of dividend taxes on the cost of capital and investment. The debate is
centered around two views, the ‘traditional’ view and the ‘new’ view. The aforementioned
articles belong to the new view, in the sense that dividend taxes have no eﬀects on capital
formation. In contrast, according to the traditional view, dividend taxes reduce the capital
stock because they increase the cost of capital. In a framework with no household hetero-
5An equivalent formulation assuming static firms that rent capital from consumers is available upon
request. See also Cárceles-Poveda and Coen Pirani (2010) for a general equivalence result between the two
settings with incomplete markets but no taxes.
6Conesa and Dominguez (2010), in particular, study optimal corporate and dividend taxes in a framework
similar to the one in McGrattan and Prescott (2005).
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geneity, the work of Poterba and Summers (1983), Auerbach and Hassett (2003) and, more
recently, of Gourio and Miao (2011) has shed light on the implicit assumptions underlying
each view, specifically with regard to the marginal sources and uses of funds. Within that
framework, if the sources and uses of funds are the same, then the firm is unaﬀected by the
dividend tax and it conforms to the ‘new’ view. However, if the sources and uses of funds are
asymmetric, then the dividend tax distorts capital formation. The most common scenario of
the latter case would involve funds raised through equity issuance and the resulting returns
to investment being paid out as dividends in the future.
An important implication of our model is that this intimate connection between sources
and uses of funds and the two views is broken when we introduce household heterogeneity.
In our model, firms do not use equity issuance to finance investment. Instead, the marginal
source of financing is retained earnings (i.e. a reduction in dividends) and the resulting
profits are distributed as dividends in the future. In the above taxonomy, our firm would
thus conform to the new view, since the sources and uses of funds are symmetric. However,
it does not conform to the spirit of the new view, since dividend taxes have real eﬀects on
investment and dividends. This should raise concerns about tests of the new versus the
traditional view based on theoretical implications of representative agent models. Empirical
evidence of an increase in dividend payments in response to a decrease in dividend taxes is
often seen as evidence in favor of the traditional view and, specifically, of the idea that the
marginal source of funds is equity issuance. This seems to contradict the observation that
the overwhelming majority of investment is carried out by mature firms who use internal
funds to finance their investment.7 Our model provides a reconciliation of these two pieces
of evidence. In our environment, dividends respond strongly and positively to a decrease in
dividend taxes, even though investment is financed exclusively using internal funds.8 The
implication is that one should be cautious when using empirical tests based on the response
of dividends to distinguish between the two views.
Both the preceding discussion of the literature and our model in the main body of the
paper assume that the tax reform is unexpected and perceived as permanent. These as-
sumptions are not innocuous. If individuals face a non-constant dividend tax rate profile, as
would be the case if the reform was temporary or expected, then the dividend tax will aﬀect
7Using Compustat data, Gourio and Miao (2010) find that firms which distribute dividends and use
retained earnings to finance investment undertake more than 90% of investment and hold more than 90%
of the capital stock. In earlier work using the Survey of Current Business and Federal Reserve Bulletins,
Sinn (1991) concludes that "...most corporate equity capital is generated by internal investment rather than
new share issues". The recent theoretical literature studying the eﬀects of dividend and capital gains taxes
seems to have adopted this view at least as a benchmark.
8A similar result is obtained by Chetty and Saez (2010) in an agency model of the firm.
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investment even in the absence of heterogeneity.9 We discuss each of those assumptions in
turn.
There are good reasons to believe that the reform was unexpected. It was not part
of Bush’s 2001 election platform, it was first suggested in January 2003 and seemed to
lose momentum several times in the following months until it was signed into law in May
2003. Thus, the window of opportunity for anticipation eﬀects to matter was short. This is
confirmed in Chetty and Saez (2005), who provide empirical evidence supporting the idea
that the tax cuts were unexpected.
Whether the reform was perceived as temporary or permanent is more controversial.
While the JGTRRA included a sunset provision, it was clear at the time that this was not
introduced because the tax reform was intended to be temporary, but rather as a means
of circumventing the Byrd rule and avoiding having the act blocked in the Senate. In fact,
a statement published in 2003 by a panel of economists opposing the tax cuts states this
perception explicitly: "...Regardless of how one views the specifics of the Bush plan, there is
wide agreement that its purpose is a permanent change in the tax structure...The permanent
dividend tax cut, in particular, is not credible as a short-term stimulus...". Auerbach and
Hassett’s (2005) work also seems to support the idea that markets perceived this tax change
as fairly permanent. To the extent that markets perceived the reform as temporary, both
Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) and Gourio and Miao (2011) have shown that the dividend tax
cut would tend to increase dividend payments and decrease investment. In this sense, our
results would be further strengthened in that case.
The article most closely related to ours is the one by Gourio and Miao (2010). They
investigate the eﬀects of the JGTRRA in a general equilibrium model with firm heterogene-
ity.10 Firm heterogeneity is something we have abstracted from in this paper and which,
interestingly, leads to opposite conclusions about the eﬀects of the reform. Gourio and Miao
(2010) find that the reform could lead to an increase in investment through several channels.
First, the decrease in capital gains taxes reduces the cost of capital for all firms, making
it easier to invest. This mechanism is also present in our model, albeit dominated by the
wealth eﬀect of the dividend tax cut. Second, there are reallocation eﬀects which are ab-
sent from our study. In particular, their model features firms that can be in one of three
finance regimes: liquidity constrained, equity issuing or dividend paying. The last two types,
and particularly the equity issuing firms, are the ones that are most productive and hence
carry out the majority of investment in that model. The reform has the eﬀect of moving
9A non-constant dividend tax profile is introduced by Korinek and Stiglitz (2009), McGrattan (2010), by
Gourio and Miao (2011) and, indirectly, by Santoro and Wei (2009b).
10Korinek and Stiglitz (2009) do this in a partial equilibrium framework.
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firms from the liquidity constrained stage to the equity issuing (and to the dividend paying)
stage and, hence, increases aggregate investment through reallocation. Additionally, because
the sources and uses of funds are asymmetric for equity issuing firms, the dividend tax cut
directly reduces the cost of capital for those firms which also raises investment. These consid-
erations suggest that the JGTRRA tax cuts might have generated opposite forces aﬀecting
aggregate investment, which only changed moderately following the tax cuts, as documented
in Desai and Goolsbee (2004). We view our results as complementary to those in Gourio and
Miao (2010).11 From a quantitative perspective, given that mature firms hold the majority
of capital and undertake the majority of investment in the US economy, we view our focus
on mature firms as a reasonable abstraction.
3 The Model
We consider an infinite horizon economy with endogenous production and uninsurable labor
income risk. The economy is populated by a continuum (measure 1) of infinitely lived
households that are indexed by , a representative firm that maximizes its market value
and a government that maintains a balanced budget. Time is discrete and indexed by
 = 0 1 2 
3.1 Households
Households have identical additively separable preferences over sequences of consumption
 ≡ {}∞=0 of the form:
() = 0
∞X
=0
 ()  (1)
where  ∈ (0 1) is the subjective discount factor and 0 denotes the expectation conditional
on information at date  = 0. The period utility function  (·) : R+ → R is assumed to be
strictly increasing, strictly concave and continuously diﬀerentiable, with lim→0 0() = ∞
and lim→∞ 0() = 0.
Each period, households can only trade in stocks of the firm to insure against uncertainty.
We denote by −1 the number of stocks held at the beginning of period . Stocks can be
traded between households at a competitive price  and the ownership of stocks entitles the
shareholder to a dividend per share of . We assume that there is no aggregate uncertainty,
implying that dividends, the stock price and hence the return on the stock are certain.
11Since we introduce household heterogeneity, we need to abstract from firm heterogeneity in order to
maintain computational tractability.
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In addition to asset income, household  earns labor income. We assume that all house-
holds supply a fixed amount of labor (normalized to one) but their productivity, , varies
stochastically. This productivity is i.i.d. across households and follows a Markov process
with transition matrix Π(0|) and  possible values. Individual labor income is thus equal
to , where  is the aggregate wage rate.
The government levies proportional taxes on labor income, dividend income and capital
gains income at rates of  ,  and   respectively. Households can use their after-tax
income from all sources to purchase consumption goods or to purchase additional stocks.
The households’ budget constraint can be expressed as:
 +  = (1−  ) + ((1− ) + ) −1 −   ( − −1) −1 (2)
Note that we have simplified by assuming capital gains taxes are paid on an accrual basis
and that capital losses are subsidized at the same rate.12 At each date, household  also faces
a no short-selling constraint on stocks:
 ≥ 0 (3)
The presence of this constraint will allow us to have a well-defined firm objective on
which all the shareholders agree, despite the market incompleteness. Individuals choose how
much to consume and how many stocks to buy in each period given prices, dividends and
tax rates {     }∞=0.
Before proceeding with the description of the firm, we derive the relationship between
stock prices and future dividends, which we call the price dividend mapping. We will use
this mapping in the following subsection to define the value of the firm and to derive the
relationship between physical capital and the stock price.
The optimal choice of stocks by an unconstrained household  with   0 requires the
following optimality condition to hold:
 = +1 [(1− ) +1 + +1 −   (+1 − )] (4)
where  denotes the marginal utility of the agent. As usual, the expected intertemporal
marginal rates of substitution for all unconstrained households are equalized and they are
equal to the reciprocal of the gross return from the stock between  and + 1
1 + +1 ≡ [(1− ) +1 + +1 −   (+1 − )] =

+1 (5)
12For a way to model capital gains taxes on a realization basis see Kydland, Gavin and Pakko (2007).
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Using this relationship, the absence of aggregate uncertainty and assuming that there are
no-bubbles, the stock price can then be written as a function of dividends as follows13
 =
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + +1+
1−
!
1− 
1−   + (6)
3.2 The Firm
The representative firm owns the capital stock , hires labor and combines these two inputs
to produce consumption goods using a constant returns to scale technology:
 =  ( )
where  and  are the aggregate capital and eﬀective labor, while  is the total factor
productivity, which is assumed to be constant. The total number of stocks outstanding is
normalized to one and we assume that the firm has no access to additional sources of external
finance, namely, it cannot issue new equity or debt. Thus the total wage bill and investment
as well as the distributions of dividends to shareholders have to be financed solely using
internal funds.14 The firm’s financing constraint is therefore:
 ++1 − (1− ) +  =  ( ) (7)
where  ∈ [0 1] is the capital depreciation rate.
The firm’s objective is to maximize its market value for the shareholders. In general,
when markets are incomplete, maximizing the value of the firm is not an objective to which
all shareholders would agree. However, Cárceles-Poveda and Coen-Pirani (2009) show that,
even under incomplete markets, shareholder unanimity can be obtained if the technology
exhibits constant returns to scale and short-selling is not allowed. We maintain these two
assumptions throughout the paper. Using the price-dividend mapping (6), the value of the
firm at  can be written as:
 = 1− 
1−    +  =
∞X
=0
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + +1+
1−
!
1− 
1−   +
13The derivation of the expressions in this section can be found in Appendix A.
14We do not allow firms to use repurchases as a means of distributing profits. See Gordon and Dietz (2009)
for a discussion of alternative ways to ensure firms pay dividends.
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Maximizing this objective subject to (7) leads to the aggregate labor demand equation:
 =  ( ) (8)
Optimal investment dynamics are described by the capital Euler equation:
1 =
1
1 + +1
1−
(1−  + (+1 +1)) (9)
As shown in Appendix A, this last expression together with (6) implies the following relation
between aggregate capital and the stock price:
 = 1− 
1−  +1 (10)
Diﬀerences between dividend and capital gains tax rates create a wedge between the
physical capital stock and its market valuation. Crucially for the results that will follow,
changes in the ratio 1−
1− will cause movements in the total wealth held by households, even
keeping the capital stock constant.
3.3 Government
In each period , the government consumes an exogenous, constant amount  and taxes
labor, dividend and capital gains income at rates  ,  and   respectively. We assume that
the government has a balanced budget. The government budget constraint is given by
 =  +   +  ( − −1) (11)
3.4 Recursive Competitive Equilibrium
In the present framework, the aggregate state of the economy is given by the aggregate
capital stock  together with the joint distribution Ψ of consumers over individual stock
holdings  and idiosyncratic productivity . Households perceive that Ψ evolves according
to:
Ψ0 = Γ (Ψ)
where Γ represents the transition function from the current aggregate state into tomorrow’s
stock-productivity distribution. The aggregate capital stock evolves according to:
 0 = Φ (Ψ)
11
Since the individual state vector consists of individual labor productivity and stock holdings
( ), the relevant state variables for a household are summarized by the vector ( ;Ψ).15
Definition: Given the transition matrix Π, as well as initial values for the aggregate
capital stock 0 and for the distribution over stocks and productivity Ψ0, a recursive com-
petitive equilibrium relative to a government policy (     ) consists of laws of motion Γ
and Φ, stock price and wage functions  ( 0) and  (), firm choices 0,  () and  ( 0)
and individual household policy functions ( ;Ψ) and ( ;Ψ), as well as associated
value functions  ( ;Ψ) such that:
• Optimal Household Choice: Given prices and aggregates, the individual policy func-
tions ( ;Ψ), ( ;Ψ) and the value function  ( ;Ψ) solve the problem
of the household:
 ( ;Ψ) = max0
⎧
⎨
⎩() + 
X
0|
Π(0|) (0 0; 0Ψ0)
⎫
⎬
⎭ s.t. (12)
+  ( 0) (0 − ) = (1−  ) () + (1− ) ( 0)−   ( ( 0)−  ()) 
0 ≥ 0
Ψ0 = Γ (Ψ)
 0 = Φ (Ψ)
• Firm Value Maximization: Given prices,  0,  () and  ( 0) satisfy firm optimal-
ity and the firm’s financing constraint:
 ( 0) = 1− 
1−  
0
 () = ( ())
 ( 0) =  ( ()) + (1− ) − 0 −  () ()
• Government Budget Balance: Government spending equals government revenue:
 =   () () +  ( 0) +   ( ( 0)−  ())
15Note that, contrary to a framework were households own the capital directly, the aggregate capital 
contains additional information on top of Ψ. The additional information consists essentially of the past stock
price, which could equivalently be used as a state variable instead of .
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• Market Clearing: Prices are such that all markets clear:Z
( ;Ψ)Ψ( ) = 1Z
Ψ( ) =  ()Z
( ;Ψ)Ψ( ) + 0 + =  ( ()) + (1− )
• Consistency: Γ and Φ are consistent with the agents’ optimal decisions.
4 Qualitative Analysis
A key result of this paper is that, in the presence of uninsured idiosyncratic risk, a reduction
in dividend taxes reduces the capital stock. This section explains why this has to be the case
theoretically, while the following section evaluates the quantitative importance of this eﬀect
in the context of the 2003 tax reform both in the long run and throughout the transition.
Our discussion in this section focuses on steady states.
To understand the eﬀects of taxes on distributions on the capital stock, the three key
equations are the stock Euler equation (5), the capital Euler equation (9) and the price-
capital relationship (10). This is directly analogous to a standard Aiyagari economy. In fact,
using a simple change of variable will make this analogy clear and help with the intuition.
Let +1 denote the (value of) assets acquired by individual  at time 
+1 ≡  (13)
Using the definition of the after tax return  given in (5), the budget constraint (2) can be
written as:
 + +1 = (1−  ) + (1 + )  (14)
This makes it clear that what matters for household consumption and savings decisions
is the after tax return  as opposed to  and  separately. Equation (5) represents an
individual’s demand for assets and aggregating across  we obtain the aggregate demand for
assets +1 as a function of the after tax return . When markets are incomplete, this
aggregate demand for assets is increasing in  and tends to infinity as the return approaches
the time preference rate 1 − 1 because of the precautionary savings motive. We call this
curve equity demand and denote it by .16
16This is what Aiyagari calls the capital supply curve. There is no guarantee that this curve is smooth in
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Figure 1: Equilibrium in an Aiyagari (1994) model where  = 1.
Equations (9) and (10) will be used to provide the equity supply curve. The first one
describes the firm’s desired capital stock  as a function of . The second one describes the
relationship between assets inside the firm (the capital stock) and assets outside the firm
(the market value of stocks). This last relationship states that one unit of capital inside the
firm is valued at  = 1−
1− by investors. The aggregate supply of assets is equal to the market
value of all stocks,  = . This is given as a function of  by combining (9) and (10). We
call this curve equity supply and denote it by  .
In equilibrium, aggregate asset demand has to equal the stock value, +1 = . If
there are no taxes on capital gains and dividends, or if these two taxes are the same, then
 = 1. This implies that the value of capital inside the firm is equal to the value of the firm’s
equity. In that case, our model is equivalent to a standard incomplete markets economy like
the one in Aiyagari (1994). The equilibrium can then be represented as in Figure (1).
When  = 1,  =  and the equity supply curve  coincides with the familiar down-
ward sloping marginal product of capital schedule, as in a standard Aiyagari economy. The
equilibrium return ∗ and the equilibrium value of assets held ∗ are found at the intersection
of the equity supply curve  and the equity demand curve , while the equilibrium level
of the capital stock can be read oﬀ the  curve once ∗ is known.
Now suppose there is a diﬀerence in dividend and capital gains tax rates and suppose, for
general, but this turns out to be the case in our numerical experiments.
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Figure 2: Equilibrium in our model where   1
the sake of exposition, that     so that   1. This has been the case historically for the
US and will be assumed for the pre-reform steady state in our quantitative experiments. A
unit of capital in the firm is now worth less than one unit to the shareholders. As a result, the
value of stocks  and the physical capital  held by the firm will not be the same. Figure 2
shows how to obtain the equilibrium return in the stock market and the implied capital stock
in such an economy. Similarly to the previous case, the equity demand curve  is simply
a depiction of the demand for wealth +1 given by the aggregated stock Euler equation
(5). To obtain the equity supply curve  , the first step is the same as before, namely, we
plot the capital stock  given in (9). But when we translate this into the supply of assets
by multiplying it by , the equity supply curve  is now below the  curve because   1.
The equilibrium in the stock market is (∗ ∗) and the implied capital stock is ∗ = 1−
1−∗.
Consider now a decrease in , keeping   fixed. This has no eﬀect on the  and 
schedules but it does increase  and therefore shifts the  schedule to the right. The new
 curve is the dashed line shown in Figure 3.17 A decrease in dividend taxes raises the
rate of return and, interestingly, has opposite eﬀects on the stock price and the aggregate
capital stock, raising the former and reducing the latter. The intuition is straightforward.
At the prevailing rate ∗, households want to hold the same wealth as before and firms want
to invest the same capital stock as before. But this capital stock is now valued more so that
17The graphical depiction assumes that  increases but remains below 1. In the experiment of the next
section,  increases to exactly 1, which leads qualitatively to the same eﬀects.
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Figure 3: The eﬀect of an increase in  in our model.
the supply of wealth is now higher. In order to induce households to hold more wealth, the
return on stocks has to increase and this increase serves as the signal to the firm to start
reducing the capital stock.
This result suggests that using a cut in dividend taxes as a way to promote investment
can actually have negative eﬀects on the capital stock and achieve the exact opposite eﬀect.
A crucial aspect required to yield this result is that the desired wealth held by households
is not perfectly elastic, as it would be in a complete markets infinite horizon economy. The
equilibrium with complete markets is depicted in Figure 4. After a decrease in the dividend
tax, the stock price increases proportionally to the change in the tax. Wealth held by
individuals is now higher than before, but agents are content to hold this higher amount of
wealth as long as the return remains equal to the time preference rate. The end result is an
increase in stock prices but no change in capital (or any other variable). This is the essence
of Proposition 2 in McGrattan and Prescott (2005) and Proposition 1 in Santoro and Wei
(2009a) and the sense in which dividend taxes are not distortionary under the new view.
An alternative extreme would be to postulate that the desired wealth schedule  is
perfectly inelastic. Indeed, this would be a formalization of the intuition given by Poterba
and Summers (1983), who argue that " If the desired wealth-to-income ratio is fixed, then
an increase in the dividend tax, which reduces each capital good’s market value, will actually
increase equilibrium capital intensity". This intuition is not borne out of their model, which
conforms to the standard infinite horizon complete markets model and therefore predicts no
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Figure 4: The eﬀect of an increase in  in a representative agent model.
eﬀects of dividend taxes on the capital stock. Our Bewley economy delivers this intuitive
result, by allowing both the desired level of wealth and the long run rate of return to be
endogenously determined.
The preceding discussion essentially analyzes the eﬀects of an increase in . This can
arise through any combination of changes in  and   that increases 1−1− . However, there
are two important diﬀerences between the two tax changes. First, a reduction in   reduces
 and leads to the exact opposite eﬀects to those discussed above. In particular, a decrease
in  , will raise the capital stock but reduce the stock price, ceteris paribus. Second, when 
falls but   is kept fixed, the dividend tax change does not directly aﬀect the cost of capital
in the sense that it does not distort the capital Euler equation. This means that  aﬀects
the equilibrium only through its eﬀect on . By contrast, a change in   directly distorts
the capital Euler equation and therefore has additional eﬀects that are more closely related
to the standard eﬀects of capital taxes. In particular, a decrease in the capital gains tax
rate reduces the cost of capital 
1− and this has the direct eﬀect of shifting the  curve
outwards. The implied wealth provided by the firm is therefore also shifted outward, keeping
 fixed. So, the capital stock increases for two reasons after a decrease in  , but the stock
price could go either way depending on which eﬀect is stronger.
To summarize, in our economy, a reduction in dividend taxes reduces the capital stock
and increases the stock price but a reduction in capital gains taxes increases the capital
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stock and has ambiguous eﬀects on the stock price. In the tax reform experiment of the
next section, both taxes fall, but  falls by more than   leading to a rise in . This eﬀect
will thus be present but there are additional eﬀects arising from the change in  . The
overall eﬀect of a reform that reduces both is, thus, theoretically ambiguous and can only
be determined by quantifying these mechanisms. This is the objective of the following two
sections.
5 Quantitative Results
This section uses a calibrated version of our model to study the eﬀects of the 2003 capital tax
reforms. First, we discuss the calibration and solution method for the benchmark economy.
Next, we study the eﬀects of a reduction in taxes both in the long run and during the
transition.
5.1 Calibration
The time period is assumed to be one year. Preferences are of the CRRA class,  () =
[1−−1]
1− , with a risk aversion of  = 2. The production function is Cobb-Douglas,  () =
1− with  = 032 and the technology parameter  is normalized so that output is
equal to one in the steady state of the deterministic version of our economy. We choose a
discount factor  = 092 to match an average capital to output ratio of 28. The depreciation
rate is set to  = 0103. Although this depreciation rate implies a very high investment to
output ratio, it is chosen to match the average dividend to GDP ratio of 28% observed in
NIPA data up to 2002.18
Table 1: Earnings Process
² =
h
100 529 4655
i
Π∗=
h
0498 0443 0059
i
Π (0|) =
⎡
⎢⎣
0992 0008 0000
0009 0980 0011
0000 0083 0917
⎤
⎥⎦
18In a previous version of the paper we calibrated the capital depreciation rate to match the investment to
GDP ratio which resulted in a much higher dividend to GDP ratio. This, in turn, led to much larger eﬀects
of changes in dividend taxation. In this sense, our current calibration biases the quantitative significance of
our results downwards.
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The idiosyncratic labor productivity process is taken from Davila, Hong, Krusell and
Ríos-Rull (2007). They construct the process so as to generate inequality measures for earn-
ings and (endogenously) wealth that are close to US data using a very parsimonious model.19
As shown in Table 1, this is achieved with a three-state Markov chain with transition matrix
Π (0|) exhibiting very strong persistence and productivity values ² that assign productive
individuals 46 times the productivity of unproductive individuals. The resulting stationary
distribution is denoted by Π∗ and is also displayed in Table 1.
We take our tax rates from Feenberg and Coutts (1993).20 These are Federal plus State
marginal tax rates for wages, qualified dividends and long term capital gains respectively.
For our benchmark economy we use   = 028,  = 031 and   = 024, which are the values
reported for 2002.21 With these taxes, the implied government spending to output ratio
before the reform is equal to 20%, which is very close to the government to output ratio
of 19% in the US. Feenberg and Coutts report marginal tax rates of 1842 and 1964 for
dividends and capital gains respectively for 2003. Since the intention of the reform was to
equalize the two tax rates, and since the case of equal tax rates is the standard theoretical
benchmark with  = , it seems natural to choose equal rates after the reform. Thus we
assume dividend and capital gains tax rates are reduced to  =   = 019. In our main
reform experiment, the labor tax rate adjusts to balance the budget but we also consider
an alternative reform where the foregone government revenue is recovered using lump sum
taxes.
5.2 Solution Method
To solve the model, we use a policy function iteration algorithm that is described in detail
in Appendix B. In order to evaluate the welfare eﬀect of tax reforms, we have also computed
the transition of our economy between the stationary distributions of the pre reform and the
post reform steady states. The extra diﬃculty of this exercise is that factor prices and the
distribution of individuals over asset holdings and labor income change during the transition.
19For details on this see also Diaz, Pijoan-Mas, Ríos-Rull (2003) and Castaneda, Diaz-Gimenez and Ríos-
Rull (2003).
20The data we use can be downloaded from http://www.nber.org/taxsim.
21Using an average of the tax rates for years 1997 to 2002 gives essentially the same numbers.
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5.3 Tax Reform Experiments
5.3.1 Long Run
We begin with an analysis of the long run implications of revenue neutral tax reforms that
reduce dividend and (or) capital gains taxes at the expense of higher labor income taxes. To
isolate the eﬀects of each of these tax changes, we start by analyzing a reduction in dividend
taxes and capital gains taxes separately. First, we consider the eﬀects of a reduction in the
dividend tax rate while maintaining the capital gains tax at   = 024 (reform 1).22 Next,
we consider a reform that reduces capital gains taxes while keeping dividend taxes at the
original level of  = 031 (reform 2). Finally, we consider the full tax reform in which both
the dividend and the capital gains taxes are reduced to 19% (reform 3). In all the reforms
we consider, the government is required to maintain a balanced budget for the same level of
government spending as in the benchmark economy. This implies that labor taxes have to
be adjusted upwards unless the reform is self-financing (see reform 2).
Table 2 reports steady state results for the three experiments. The first column displays
results for the benchmark economy and the other three columns display the resulting long
run steady state values after each of the reforms. The diﬀerent rows correspond to the tax
rates (    ), the stock return , the level of output  , the aggregate capital , the
stock price , the aggregate wage rate and dividends before taxes ( ) and after taxes
((1−  ) (1− ) ) as well as three measures of the long run welfare eﬀects of the reform.
We compute the welfare change , in consumption equivalent (ce) terms, based on a utili-
tarian social welfare function. Following Domeij and Heathcote (2004), we also decompose
the total welfare change into an aggregate component ˆ and a distributional component ˜.23
Table 2: Long run eﬀects of tax reforms
22The aim of this experiment is to provide a decomposition of the eﬀects of lowering diﬀerent taxes.
However, it should be pointed out that these tax rates could generate tax arbitrage if raising new equity
were allowed. In this case, firms would be able to raise $1 of new equity at a cost of 1 −  and then use
these funds to pay dividends, with a gain of (1− )− (1− )  0 to the shareholders.
23The exact computations used are given in Appendix C. See also Domeij and Heathcote (2004) for more
details.
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Benchmark Reform 1 Reform 2 Reform 3
(    ) (031 024 028) (019 024 029) (031 019 028) (019 019 029)
 07 13 055 12
 136 132 (−3%) 138 (+15%) 133 (−18%)
 382 346 (−94%) 399 (+42%) 362 (−5%)
 347 369 (+6%) 340 (−23%) 362 (+4%)
 0166 0160 (−36%) 0168 (+12%) 0163 (−18%)
(1−  ) 0119 0114 (−44%) 0121 (+17%) 0116 (−24%)
 0038 0062 (+39%) 0027 (−31%) 0052 (+36%)
(1− ) 0026 0050 (+48%) 0019 (−27%) 0042 (+62%)
ce total  0 −30% 09% −19%
ce aggregate ˆ 0 −08% 02% −05%
ce distribution ˜ 0 −23% 07% −14%
Reform 1 reduces  from 031 to 019. Despite the large reduction in the tax rate, the
eﬀect on the government budget is quite small because we have calibrated our economy so
that dividend income is a small percentage of GDP. As a result, the government can balance
its budget using a very small increase in the labor tax rate, from 028 to 029. As described
in the previous section, the decrease in  raises the market value of capital and thus the
value of the assets held by individuals. This leads to an increase in the rate of return and
a decrease in the capital stock. In addition, there is a secondary channel through which
the capital stock is reduced. The reform leads to a change in the composition of income,
with labor income, which is risky, becoming a smaller fraction of the total. This is both
because of taxation shifting from capital to labor and because of the endogenous response of
before-tax wages and dividends. Both mechanisms increase capital income and reduce labor
income, thus reducing the amount of risk faced by households and, consequently, reducing
precautionary savings. Overall, the capital stock falls by more than 9% while, at the same
time, the stock price rises by 6%.
Comparing welfare measures across steady states we find that total welfare is reduced by
3%. This can be decomposed into an aggregate and a distributional component following
Domeij and Heathcote (2004). Whereas they find a positive aggregate eﬀect and a negative
distributional eﬀect of a reduction in capital income taxes, our finding is that both compo-
nents are negative. The negative aggregate welfare eﬀect is a direct result of the reduction
in the capital stock which, in the long run, reduces output and aggregate consumption. The
distributional eﬀect is negative for reasons similar to those found in the previous literature
on capital taxation. As labor income is reduced relative to capital income, individuals at the
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low end of the wealth distribution suﬀer welfare losses whereas those at the high end enjoy
welfare gains. Given a utilitarian welfare function, and a strictly decreasing marginal utility,
the loss of the wealth-poor section of the population is reflected more strongly in the aggre-
gate welfare measure. In sum, the reduction in the dividend tax increases the stock price,
decreases the aggregate capital stock and reduces total welfare due to negative aggregate
and distributional eﬀects.
In many respects, the capital gains tax rate reduction works in the opposite direction.
Focusing on the results from reform 2, we find an increase in the capital stock and a decrease
in the rate of return. The stock price falls, because the eﬀect from the decrease in  dominates
the counteracting eﬀect of the decrease in the cost of capital, which pushes the capital demand
schedule (and thus the price) upwards. As the capital stock increases, that also implies an
increase in the marginal product of labor which increases labor income. Notice that the
labor tax rate is eﬀectively unchanged which reflects the fact that the government collects
no revenues from taxing capital gains at steady state. Thus, the reduction in the capital
gains tax rate does not cause a deterioration in the government’s budget. In fact, because
wages increase as a result of the reform, the tax base increases and the labor tax rate that
balances the budget is slightly lower (not seen up to the second digit reported). This reform
is therefore self-financing at steady state. Overall, the welfare eﬀects of the capital gains tax
decrease are positive but smaller than in the case of dividend taxes. This largely reflects the
fact that the capital gains tax rate falls by less than the fall in the dividend tax in the first
reform. In sum, the decrease in the capital gains tax decreases the stock price, increases the
aggregate capital stock and raises total welfare due to positive aggregate and distributional
eﬀects.
Once the two separate changes have been understood, the full reform (reform 3) follows
easily. The eﬀects of the reform are qualitatively the same as the dividend tax cut, but
quantitatively less strong because the capital gains tax rate reduction partly mitigates these
eﬀects. Quantitatively, we find a 5% reduction in the long run capital stock, a 4% increase
in stock prices and a negative long run welfare eﬀect equivalent to a 2% permanent reduc-
tion in consumption, arising both from reduced aggregate consumption and from reverse
redistribution.
It is perhaps too early to assess whether these long run eﬀects can be seen in the data.
Initial evidence, however, seems to be consistent with the theoretical prediction on stock
returns. Consider, for example, the average after tax return, which is equal to  = (1−) =(1−)
 in the present model. Using the average dividend to capital ratios

 before and after
2003 from NIPA data, and letting   fall from 024 to 019 as in the theoretical experiment,
we obtain an increase in the stock return from 072 to 123. Comparing to Table 2, the
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first value coincides with the level of returns in our benchmark calibration by construction.
Remarkably, the second value also coincides with the predicted after tax return following
reform 3. The fact that the dividend-to-capital ratio has increased following the JGTRRA
is also confirmed by Gourio and Miao (2010) and by DeBacker (2009) using Compustat
data. A more thorough examination of the data, as in e.g. Chetty and Saez (2005) and
Poterba (2004), also seems to suggest there was a significant increase in dividends following
the reform.
Looking at steady states allows us to clarify the intuition for our results and understand
the qualitative mechanisms taking place in our model. However, for obtaining a quanti-
tative assessment of the welfare eﬀects of the tax reform it is imperative that we consider
the transition. It is well known that results about the long run are often mitigated, and
sometimes even reversed, when the short run eﬀects are included. In our case, it is clear that
this could be so. After all, the predicted reduction in the long run capital stock will reduce
aggregate consumption in the long run but increase aggregate consumption in the short run.
We investigate this further in the next section.
5.3.2 Transition
We focus on the transitional paths for the full reform (reform 3) only. We assume that the
economy begins at a steady state with dividend taxes that are equal to 31% and capital gains
taxes that are equal to 24%. These taxes are unexpectedly and permanently reduced to 19%
and 19% respectively and the economy is simulated until convergence to the new steady
state. Labor taxes are adjusted in every period of the transition to keep the government’s
budget balanced.
The paths for some of the key aggregate variables, expressed as a percentage of their initial
value, are displayed in Figures 5 and 6. The transition paths are as expected. Aggregate
capital decreases monotonically to the new steady state. Stock prices increase by almost
10% on impact, as  has suddenly risen but the capital stock has not had time to adjust.
As the economy reduces its capital stock, stock prices gradually fall towards a new steady
state, which is higher than the old one. The aggregate wage rate follows a decreasing path,
similar to the one of the aggregate capital stock. The same is true for the after tax wage,
but the decrease in the latter is larger due to the higher labor income tax rate.24 Per share
dividends rise sharply on impact as investment is reduced and after tax dividends rise even
more because the tax rate has fallen. The subsequent downward adjustment in the capital
24Since the reform is unexpected, it creates large capital gains in the initial period. In turn, these create a
one time upward jump in stock returns. In addition, these imply a much lower labor tax income needed to
balance the budget in the first period and higher after tax labor income. These three variables are plotted
here from period two onwards for expositional purposes.
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Figure 5: Aggregate Variable Transition Paths
stock brings dividends down, although they remain significantly above the pre-reform level
even in the long run.
The sharp initial increase in after-tax dividends resulting from lower investment is also
reflected in the path for aggregate consumption displayed in the upper panel of Figure 7. The
initial increase is approximately 3%, but aggregate consumption starts falling as the capital
stock decreases. Eventually, aggregate consumption falls below the original steady state
and, in the long run, settles at a level approximately 05% below the pre-reform level. This
lower level of aggregate consumption in the long run is what leads to a negative aggregate
component of welfare in the long run (see Table 2).
The overall welfare eﬀects along the transition are depicted in the lower panel of Figure
7. The decrease in welfare when the transition eﬀects are taken into account is just above
05% of consumption. This is much less than the long run decrease of 19% because of the
temporary increase in aggregate consumption. In fact, the time path of welfare gains follows
closely the time path of aggregate consumption. Performing a decomposition of the welfare
gains reveals positive aggregate welfare gains of approximately 18% when the transition is
taken into account. This is because the decrease in long run consumption is dominated by
the temporary increase in consumption in the short run. The distributional component on
the other hand is negative and larger, −23%.
Decomposing the welfare gains across individuals provides further insights into the ef-
fects of the reform. Such a decomposition is provided in Figure 8, which shows individual
welfare gains for diﬀerent combinations of productivity (labor income) and asset levels. An
examination of this figure will reveal two things: who gains and who loses from the reform
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and whether the reform could have public support or not. A couple of important obser-
vations emerge from the figure. First, welfare gains are increasing in the amount of asset
wealth held by an individual. Indeed, most individuals holding stocks gain from this reform
and only some individuals holding no stocks (and some holding very few stocks) lose. This
is not surprising, since the reform reduces the taxation of asset wealth and increases the
stock return. Second, given a large amount of asset wealth, welfare gains are higher for low
productivity individuals. This is because among agents with the same asset level, agents
with lower productivity rely less on labor income compared to asset income. Therefore, the
increase in labor income taxes and the decrease in wages hurts them the least. However,
given little or no wealth, welfare gains are lower (or rather, welfare losses are larger) for low
productivity individuals. This is because those agents enjoy very low levels of consumption
anyway and their marginal utility is very high. In addition, given the persistence of the
labor productivity process, they are unlikely to benefit from low asset taxation in the future
either.
In terms of support for the reform, individuals at the low end of the wealth distribution
and with low labor productivity would not support the reform. It turns out that the bulk
of the distribution is actually concentrated in this region. When we aggregate over the
population across asset levels and productivity levels using the stationary distribution of
the pre-reform steady state, we find that the overall political support for the reform is 20
percent. In sum, this reform would not get wide political support, mostly because of strong
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redistribution eﬀects from the poor to the rich.
6 Robustness
To conduct the quantitative analysis of the preceding section, we have had to make specific
modelling and parameter choices. Here, we investigate the robustness of our results to
changes in those choices. We consider, in turn, lump sum taxes to balance the budget
instead of adjusting labor taxes after the reform, varying the degree of households’ risk
aversion, endogenous labor supply, progressive labor income taxes, and corporate profits
taxes. We mostly focus on long run eﬀects.
6.1 Using Lump Sum Taxes
Our tax reform experiments in Section 5 assume that the government has a fixed exogenous
spending level  and maintains a balanced budget. Reductions in the taxation of dividends
and capital gains are financed by increasing labor income taxes. Here, we consider an
alternative scenario, in which labor income taxes are kept fixed after the reform and the
extra revenue is raised through the use of lump sum taxes. The results of this experiment
are shown in Table 3. The second column (labelled ‘Benchmark’) is simply a repetition of
the equilibrium values before the reform from Table 2. The third column shows the new
steady state in this alternative experiment.
Table 3: Long Run Eﬀects of Tax Reform with Lump Sum Taxes
Benchmark After Reform
(    ) (031 024 028) (019 019 028)
 07 11
 136 134 (−14%)
 383 367 (−42%)
 348 367 (+55%)
 0166 0164 (−12%)
 ∗ (1−  ) 0119 0118 (−1%)
 0038 0049 (+28%)
 ∗ (1− ) 0026 0039 (−50%)
ce total  0 −48%
ce aggregate ˆ 0 −03%
ce distributional ˜ 0 −45%
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Qualitatively, this alternative reform does not change the result of the previous section.
The capital stock falls by slightly less and the stock price increases by slightly more. The
most significant diﬀerence is in the welfare loss resulting from the reform, which is now
much larger due to a much larger distributional eﬀect. To understand why this happens, it
is important to notice that labor supply is exogenous, so the labor income tax rate does not
distort the supply of labor. In the absence of heterogeneity, this tax would be equivalent
to a lump sum tax. In our economy with heterogeneity however, both the labor tax and
the lump sum taxes aﬀect allocations by changing the distribution of income. The question
is which one has a stronger eﬀect and why. An increase in labor tax rates has negative
distributional eﬀects in the sense that poorer households rely more heavily on labor income
and are therefore hurt relatively more. Since these households have higher marginal utility,
the eﬀect on aggregate welfare is negative. However, this tax is proportional to a household’s
labor income so, the level of taxes raised from poorer households is less than that raised from
richer households. If instead the reform is financed by lump sum taxes that are equally spread
across households, this negative distributional welfare eﬀect is even stronger. This explains
the diﬀerence that we see in Table 3.
We have also considered financing the reduction in capital taxes through an individual
specific lump sum tax. This tax was constructed so that, at the pre-reform prices and
allocations, each household ends up with the same tax bill after the reform as before the
reform. This completely neutralizes any eﬀects dividend taxes might have, except for the
wealth eﬀect operating through the change in . The increase in  still leads to a fall, albeit
a smaller one, in the capital stock and welfare.
6.2 Varying Risk Aversion
It should be clear from the discussion in Section 4 that the slope of the  schedule is crucial
for determining the magnitude of the wealth eﬀect on the capital stock. The eﬀect is zero
when the slope is zero and it is maximized when the slope is infinite. Recall, in addition,
that the reduction in the capital gains tax has a second eﬀect on the capital stock that is
actually positive and that survives a perfectly elastic  schedule. It follows that in the
extreme case where  is perfectly elastic, this positive eﬀect on the capital stock should
dominate the negative wealth eﬀect, whereas when  is very steep, the negative wealth
eﬀect should dominate. It turns out that the level of risk aversion has a direct eﬀect on
this slope. As the level of risk aversion is decreased, the asset demand schedule  moves
to the left and the equilibrium capital stock is reduced. Importantly, the relevant section
of the demand schedule, i.e. the section that lies to the right of the complete markets level
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of wealth, becomes flatter. In the limit, as  → 0, the demand for assets approaches the
complete markets demand schedule, which is perfectly elastic at  = 1 − 1. At that limiting
point, the equilibrium level of the capital stock is simply the modified golden rule and there
are no precautionary savings. The negative eﬀect working through the change in wealth
is not present anymore and the reform increases the capital stock. When the level of risk
aversion is increased above a threshold, the negative eﬀect dominates and the capital stock
falls as a result of the reform. This reduction in the capital stock becomes larger as risk
aversion is further increased. This intuition is borne out in the quantitative experiment
described below.
Table 4 displays the eﬀect on the main variables of interest arising due to the reform
in three diﬀerent economies. The three economies diﬀer in their level of risk aversion. We
consider a case with low ( = 05) and a case with high ( = 5) risk aversion and compare
to our benchmark economy ( = 2).25
Evidently, the eﬀect of the reform on the capital stock is larger, the larger is the value of
. The threshold , at which the capital stock actually rises is below 05. The eﬀect on the
stock price changes sign, from an increase in the stock price for low and medium risk aversion
to a decrease in the stock price when risk aversion is relatively high. At that extreme, the
fall in the capital stock is so large that the increase in the valuation  of this capital is not
enough to raise the price.
Table 4: Long run eﬀects of tax reform for diﬀerent risk aversion
  = 05  = 05  = 2  = 2  = 5  = 5
  028 0285(+005) 028 0287(+002) 028 029(+001)
 07 08(+01) 07 11(+05) 07 16(+09)
 1074 1071(−02%) 135 133(−14%) 205 198(−34%)
 302 299(−09%) 382 362(−52%) 578 513 (−11%)
 274 299(+92%) 347 362(+43%) 524 513(−2%)
 0153 0153(+02%) 0165 0162(−18%) 025 024(−4%)
(1−  ) 011 0109(−15%) 0119 0116(−17%) 018 017(−55%)
 0037 0032(+55%) 0038 0052(+36%) 0059 0101(+71%)
(1− ) 0021 0026(+24%) 0026 0042(+61%) 004 008(+101%)
25For each , the pre-reform economy is recalibrated to meet the calibration targets described in Section
5. Specifically, we modify the discount factor to obtain the same capital output ratio of 28.
29
6.3 Labor Leisure Choice and Progressive Labor Taxes
In this section we investigate whether adding an endogenous labor leisure choice or progres-
sive labor income taxes aﬀects our results.26 To do this, we assume a standard Cobb-Douglas
specification for the period utility function:
 () =
¡ (1− )1−¢1−
1− 
We set  = 2 for comparison with our previous framework and  such that, on average, labor
is one-third of the time endowment.
First, we investigate the eﬀects of an endogenous labor leisure choice in the presence of
a flat labor income tax rate. Subsequently, we add progressive labor income taxes. In this
case, we denote individual taxable labor income by  = , where  is individual labor
supply. Total taxes are given by the function
 (;) = 0
³
 − ¡−1 + 2¢− 11 ´
where  = (0 1 2) is a vector of parameters. This functional form was first proposed
by Gouveia and Strauss (1994) and has been used by several authors such as Castañeda,
Díaz-Giménez, and Ríos-Rull (1999), Conesa and Krueger (2006) and Conesa et al. (2009).
With such a function, the average tax rate is roughly controlled by 0, while 1 governs the
degree of progressivity. When 1 → 0 there is no progressivity (flat tax rate).
We estimate the parameters of the tax function using OECD data for the US in 2003,
following the procedure of Guvenen, Kuruscu and Ozkan (2010). The OECD tax database
provides a calculator that estimates the total labor income tax liability at income levels
between one half of average wage earnings and two times average earnings. Using this
calculator, we obtain the average labor income tax rate for 31 income levels between 50%
and 200% of average earnings. To calculate average tax rates at higher income levels, we use
the US top marginal tax rate together with the corresponding top bracket as in Guvenen et al.
(2010). Finally, we fit  (;) to the constructed data points. The estimated parameters are
0 = 04143, 1 = 08881 and 2 = 13447. To implement the tax reform, we assume these
values for 0 and 1 in the pre-reform economy and we choose 2 so that the government
spending to output ratio is the same as in our benchmark economy with no endogenous
labor choice and flat labor taxes. After the dividend and capital gains taxes are reduced,
26The case with progressive dividend taxes is more complicated, since this breaks the unanimity result
with shareholder heterogeneity and the value of the firm is no longer well defined. Given this, we have
abstracted from this case.
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government budget balance is achieved by increasing 0.
Table 5 displays the results with endogenous labor leisure choice, for the full reform in
which both dividend and capital gains taxes are decreased. The first two columns display
the results with flat labor income taxes and the last two columns display the results under
progressive labor income taxes. A comparison with the last column of Table 2 indicates that
the results for both cases are qualitatively and quantitatively very similar to our benchmark
case with no labor leisure choice. Aggregate capital stock decreases and dividends and stock
prices increase by roughly the same amounts. The reason is that, in our calibration, the
fraction of government revenue raised from taxing capital income is very small. Balancing
the budget after a reduction in capital tax rates requires only a minimal change in labor taxes,
which, in turn, implies small movements in labor supply. This small (negative) movement
in equilibrium labor supply, and the accompanying extra reduction in output, are the only
quantitative diﬀerences to our benchmark.
Table 5: Long run eﬀects of tax reforms with endogenous labor supply
Benchmark Reform Benchmark Reform
Flat Taxes Flat Taxes Prog. Taxes Prog. taxes
(    ) (    ) (   0) (   0)
(031 024 028) (019 019 0289) (031 024 0414) (019 019 0431)
 075 11 077 111
 047 046 046 044
 134 127 (−52%) 129 122 (−54%)
 122 127 (+41%) 117 122 (+42%)
 0166 0163 (−18%) 0165 0163 (−12%)
 1958 1941 (−08%) 1893 1873 (−11%)
 0013 0017 (+307%) 0013 0016 (+23%)
(1− ) 0009 0014 (+55%) 0009 0013 (+44%)
When labor taxes are flat, an increase in labor taxes used to finance the decrease in
dividend and capital gains taxes, has negative redistribution eﬀects. Progressive taxes place
a disproportionately high burden on individuals with high income and hence an increase in
such taxes could, in principle, lead to less negative or even positive redistribution eﬀects.
Given our utilitarian welfare criterion, this change in redistribution eﬀects of the reform
could overturn our benchmark result about welfare. To check if this is the case, we need
to compute the transition. During the transition, we have assumed that the government
maintains budget balance every period, which is achieved by adjusting the parameter 0
every period. Whereas the aggregate welfare losses are smaller than with flat taxes (-0.25%),
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the qualitative finding is the same as with flat taxes. The reform has a negative impact on
welfare when the transition is taken into account, because a positive aggregate eﬀect (136%)
is dominated by a negative distributional eﬀect (−159%). Moreover, the implications for
diﬀerent households are very similar to those presented in figure 8.
6.4 Corporate Profit Taxes
Up to this point, we have abstracted from corporate profit taxes. To investigate the extent
to which introducing such taxes aﬀects our results, we have also computed the full reform
in the presence of these taxes. In this case, the model of Section 3 needs to be modified as
follows. The firm’s financing constraint (7) becomes
 = (1−  ) ( ( )−  − )−+1 +
the capital Euler equation (9) becomes
1 =
1
1 + +1
1−
(( (+1 +1)− ) (1−  ) + 1)
and the government budget constraint (11) now includes tax revenue from corporate profits
 =  +   +  ( − −1) +   ( ( )−  − )
where   is the corporate profits tax rate. Following Gourio and Miao (2010), we set   =
034. Table 6 reports the results of reducing dividends and capital gains taxes (reform 3) in
the presence of corporate profit taxes. The corporate profits tax rate is kept fixed after the
reform, since there was no provision to reduce it in the JGTRRA. As shown by the table,
the results are very similar to the ones obtained in Section 5, with similar changes for all
the variables after the reform is implemented. In other words, introducing corporate profits
taxes does not change our main conclusions.
Table 6: Long run eﬀects of reform 3 with corporate profits taxes
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Benchmark Reform 3
(      ) (031 024 028 034) (019 019 029 034)
 06 096
 134 131 (−22%)
 370 346 (−65%)
 336 346 (+23%)
 0164 0160 (−24%)
(1−  ) 0118 0115 (−25%)
 0031 0041 (+32%)
(1− ) 0021 0033 (+62%)
7 Conclusion
This paper studies the eﬀects of a reduction in dividend and capital gains taxes. Our finding
that reductions in these taxes lead to reverse redistribution, and hence are detrimental from
the point of view of a utilitarian social welfare function, is in line with previous research on
capital tax reforms. The new insight, obtained by disaggregating capital taxes into dividend
and capital gains taxes, is that a dividend tax cut can have the exact opposite eﬀect from
the one intended, i.e. it can reduce investment instead of increasing it. We explain that this
result arises because the increase in stock prices feeds back to household choices through a
wealth eﬀect. We also provide a quantitative assessment of the 2003 JGTRRA reform and
find it to be welfare reducing, even after positive short run eﬀects are taken into account.
Given that our result on the eﬀect of dividend taxes on investment is surprising, a question
that could easily arise is whether this mechanism is borne out by the aftermath of the 2003
reform. Desai and Goolsbee (2004) touch on this issue and find the investment recovery
from 2003 onwards to be weaker than previous recoveries. As Kevin Hassett suggests in
his discussion of that paper, it is not clear that comparing to previous recoveries is the
right metric to be used. Looking at the raw data, there does seem to be an increase in
capital expenditures following the 2003 reform. However, it is important to realize that the
reform did not only change dividend taxes. Various other provisions, such as the increase in
depreciation allowances, the decrease in estate taxes and the decrease in the level and the
progressivity of labor taxes, could have spurred investment despite the dividend tax decrease.
An attempt at empirically evaluating the eﬀect of dividend taxes on investment would
have to separate these eﬀects as well as somehow take into account the business cycle.
Unfortunately, estimating the eﬀects of dividend taxes on investment is not a straightforward
exercise. To quote Chetty and Saez (2005) “ ... the time series of investment is extremely
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volatile and of much larger magnitude than dividend payments."27 Crucially, even if the
ceteris paribus eﬀect of the dividend tax cut on investment could be conclusively determined
empirically, that eﬀect would only be the result of a combination of diﬀerent mechanisms.
The decrease in dividend taxes exerts a downward pressure on investment because of the
mechanism explained in this paper. Additional downward pressure would arise to the extent
that the reform is perceived as temporary, as argued in Gourio and Miao (2011) and in
Korinek and Stiglitz (2008) . On the other hand, the tax cut exerts an upward pressure in
the presence of firm heterogeneity as explained in Gourio and Miao (2010) or in the presence
of agency issues as in Chetty and Saez (2010).
Although it would be interesting to have a framework that includes all these mechanisms
simultaneously so as to gauge their relative importance, such a model would be computa-
tionally challenging if not unfeasible. One can only speculate about the relative importance
of these diﬀerent channels quantitatively. The main mechanisms leading to increased invest-
ment as a result of dividend tax cuts that are missing from our model, are those operating
through growing, equity issuing firms. These firms account for approximately 10% of the
aggregate capital stock and of investment according to Compustat data reported in Gourio
and Miao (2010). It seems reasonable to conjecture that the mechanism identified here will
have larger eﬀects since it operates through mature firms which account for 90%. This is,
however, only a conjecture and there could be interesting interactions of the diﬀerent mech-
anisms which could only be gauged in a model combining household and firm heterogeneity.
This would be an interesting, but challenging, way forward.
Finally, we focus more closely on the eﬀects of dividend taxes compared to capital gains
taxes. Such focus is partly because the change in dividend taxes was of a much larger
magnitude but also because we view our treatment of capital gains taxes as less satisfactory.
In our model capital gains are taxed on an accrual basis which simplifies the computational
burden significantly but is arguably unrealistic. In practice, capital gains are only taxed
upon realization and this allows individuals to time the realization of capital gains in their
favor. It is often suggested, see for example Poterba (2004) or Sinn (1991), that this could be
crudely modelled as an accrual tax at a lower rate. To the extent this is true, our main result
of a fall in the capital stock and in welfare should survive such an extension since this would
reduce the eﬀects of capital gains taxes. One could also explicitly model realization-based
capital gains taxes along the lines of Gavin, Kydland and Pakko (2007), but at a higher
computational cost.
27Similar statements about the diﬃculty of assessing these eﬀects can be found in Hassett’s discussion of
Desai and Goolsbee’s article. Poterba’s (2004) take on existing evidence on this issue is that it is "contro-
versial".
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APPENDIX
Appendix A: The Relationship between the Stock Price and the Capital Stock
Using the definition of the risk-free return, together with the stock Euler condition (4),
we can write the stock price at time  as:
 (1 + +1) = [(1− ) +1 + +1 −   (+1 − )]
Solving for the current stock price  yields
 = 1
1 + +1
1−
µ
1− 
1−   +1 + +1
¶
and repeated forward substitution, along with a no-bubble condition, yields the price divi-
dend mapping (6). The capital Euler condition (9) can be manipulated to write capital as a
function of dividends as follows:
1 =
1
1 + +1
1−
(1−  + (+1 +1))⇒
+1 = 1
1 + +1
1−
((1− )+1 + (+1 +1)+1)
Using the constant returns to scale assumption, we can write:
+1 = 1
1 + +1
1−
((1− )+1 + (+1 +1)− +1+1)
and replacing the right hand side from the firm’s financing constraint, we obtain:
+1 = 1
1 + +1
1−
(+1 ++2)
Repeated forward substitution (with the use of the transversality condition) leads to the
following expression:
+1 =
∞X
=1
Ã−1Y
=0
1
1 + +1+
1−
!
+ (15)
Comparing (15) to (6) gives the relationship between capital and stock price in equation
(10).
Not for Publication
Appendix B: Numerical Algorithm
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B.1 Computing the Stationary Competitive Equilibrium
We use a generalized policy function iteration algorithm, which relies on the first-order
conditions (mainly the Euler equation) of the model. We approximate all the relevant policy
and value functions with linear interpolation over the grid on assets. To solve the individual
problem with policy iterations, we proceed as follows. Given the aggregate capital , the
stock price , dividends , the wage rate  and a tax vector (    ), we let  be the
vector consisting of the individual policy functions of interest, i.e.,  = [ 0]. Let  be a
non-linear operator such that  [;     ] satisfies the individual optimality conditions
given taxes. To approximate the fixed point, we follow the steps below.
Step 1: Guess an initial vector [0;0  0 ], where 0 = [0 00]. Using 0 we can calculate
0 0 and 0.
Step 2: For each iteration  ≥ 1, use the previous guess −1 and [−1−1 −1 −1  −1]
to compute the new vector  that satisfies the individual equilibrium conditions.
Step 3: Using  and the distribution for the idiosyncratic shock Π, calculate Ψ, the joint
(stationary) distribution of assets and income. Next, use Ψ to calculate the aggregate
demand for stocks by the households to get the new stock price .
Step 4: The new tax rate on labor  is calculated givenΨ and  to satisfy the government’s
budget constraint.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 until convergence.
B.2 Computing the Transition Between Steady States
When we calculate the transition between steady states we need to adjust the above
procedure in the following way. First, for the sake of exposition, assume that convergence
to the new steady state takes place in  periods. Then we follow the steps below.
Step 1: Guess a time series for the variables
©0 ; 0  0  0  0   0ª=1  together with the
time series for the distribution of individuals {Ψ0}=1. Again, knowing {0}=1 we
can calculate {0  0  0 }=1. We then initialize the first period with the stationary
distribution of the first steady state (Ψ01 = Ψ1 and 01 = 1) and we assume that
at time  we are already in the second steady state (Ψ0 = Ψ2 and 0 = 2)).
Step 2: For each iteration  ≥ 1 and for each time period 1 ≤  ≤ −1, we use the previous
guess for the next period −1+1 and [−1  −1  −1  −1  −1  −1 ] to compute the
new vector  that satisfies the individual equilibrium conditions.
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Step 3: Using  and Π, we calculate Ψ+1, the joint distribution of assets and income and
then use Ψ+1 to calculate the demand of stocks and the new price  . These two
variables are compared to the initial guesses Ψ−1+1 and −1 for all 1 ≤  ≤  − 1.
Step 4: The new tax rate on labor for each time period 1 ≤  ≤  − 1 is calculated given
Ψ−1 and  to satisfy the government’s budget constraint at each period.
Step 5: Repeat Steps 2-4 until convergence for all periods 1 ≤  ≤  − 1.
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Appendix C: Welfare Computation and Decomposition
Transition
The economy begins at an initial steady state (at  = 0) with a given, constant level
of aggregate capital  and an initial distribution of stocks Ψ. The change in the tax
system induces a sequence of aggregate capital stocks and distributions {Ψ}=0 that
eventually converges (at time  ) to the new steady state  Ψ. Let  = ( ) be
a point in the individual state space of the economy. Given the sequence of aggregates,
the maximized utility (value function) for an individual household with individual state 
at time  is denoted by  (). Similarly, denote the corresponding consumption and stock
policy functions by () and () respectively. At steady state, the aggregates are constant
and the value functions are time independent. We use  () and  () for the steady
state value functions before and after the reform.28 The welfare of an individual household
at any point  along the transition is:
() =
∞X
=0
 X
+ |
(+|)+(+)
1−
1− 
where (+|) is the probability of state + given . To be more precise, this value can
be represented recursively as
( ) = ( )
1−
1−  + 
X
+1|
Π(+1|)+1 (+1 ( ))
This representation can be used to compute 0(0) backwards starting at  ( ) =  ( ).
Clearly, 0(0) represents the welfare of an individual with individual state 0 in the econ-
omy where the reform takes place. The corresponding welfare in case the reform does not
28We do the same for the policy functions.
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happen is simply
 (0 0) = 
(0 0)1−
1−  + 
X
1|0
Π(1|0)  ¡1 (0 0)¢
These individual welfare levels can be aggregated to yield a (utilitarian) measure of aggre-
gate/average welfare using the initial distribution of households Ψ
  = X
(00)
Ψ (0 0)
0 =
X
(00)
Ψ0(0 0)
We use   and 0 to compare welfare with and without the reform. Specifically,
we compute the equivalent variation in consumption, , defined as the percent increase in
consumption in every date/event of the economy without reform that is required to make
the old and the new aggregate welfare equal. Clearly  satisfies
1 +  =
µ 0
 
¶ 1
1−
If   0, then consumption in the old equilibrium would need to be decreased, indicating
that aggregate welfare is lower in the new equilibrium.
To decompose the overall welfare eﬀect into aggregate and distributional components we
follow the idea in Domeij and Heathcote (2004). For the aggregate component, we consider
a hypothetical economy that shares all the features of the pre-reform economy, except that
consumption is scaled by the ratio of aggregate consumptions in the pre- and post-reform
economies. In particular, we maintain the same consumption distribution across households
after the reform as the one before the reform. Let aggregate consumptions be denoted by
 and  (note the pre-reform economy is in steady state so aggregate consumption
would be constant across time). Then we can compute individual welfare at  in that economy
as
ˆ() =
∞X
=0

µ+

¶1− X
+ |
(+|)
(+)1−
1− 
This can be computed backwards using a recursive representation
ˆ( ) = 
( )1−
1− 
µ

¶1−
+  X
+1|
Π(+1|)ˆ+1 ¡+1 ( )¢
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and starting at
ˆ (   ) =
µ

¶1− ∞X
=0
 X
+ |
(+|)
(+)1−
1− 
=
µ

¶1−
 (   )
With ˆ0(0 0) in hand, the aggregate component of welfare can be computed just like before
as a consumption equivalent using the average welfare measure
ˆ0 =
X
(00)
(0 0)ˆ0(0 0)
so that
1 + ˆ =
Ã
ˆ0
 
! 1
1−
Finally, the distributional component ˜ is defined as a residual such that³
1 + ˆ
´³
1 + ˜
´
= (1 + )
Steady States
Comparing steady states is more controversial because of the diﬀerent distributions as-
sociated with the diﬀerent steady states. We compare steady state welfare making some
particular assumptions for illustrative purposes. Specifically, we define the overall average
consumption equivalent as
1 +  =
µ
 
¶ 1
1−
i.e. by comparing the average welfare level in the two steady states. We also decompose
this into aggregate and distributional components. The aggregate component is computed
by assuming that the distribution is the same in the two steady states and only adjusting
individual consumptions by the ratio of aggregate consumptions. This leads to an aggregate
component ˆ given by
1 + ˆ = 


The distributional component is then defined as a residual just like before.
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